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Binding regulation, age assurance & age-appropriate designTürkiye

Türkiye’s new social-media rules test whether age assurance can protect without exposing identity

Türkiye has published binding rules that prevent social-network providers from serving children under 15 and require differentiated protections for users aged 15 to 17. The regulation takes effect on 1 November 2026. Existing accounts must complete age verification by 31 March 2027.

01

What it could improve

The regulation goes beyond a minimum-age rule. It requires age verification designed to communicate whether a user meets an age threshold rather than disclose the person’s name or identity to the platform. For users aged 15 to 17, reported safeguards include private accounts, restrictions on direct messaging, personalised advertising, livestreaming and infinite scrolling, together with parental controls and clearer, auditable platform policies. This combination could move responsibility from families alone toward enforceable age-appropriate service design.

02

What remains unresolved

The central challenge is whether the system can recognise age reliably without creating a new identity trail or displacing children into less regulated spaces. A privacy-preserving token can reduce the information disclosed to a platform, but implementation must also prevent tokens from becoming persistent identifiers that allow activity to be linked across services.

  • Children may still use false information, borrowed accounts or another person’s verified token unless account and assurance processes resist transfer without becoming intrusive.
  • An under-15 restriction may move some children toward smaller platforms, unmanaged applications, virtual private networks or signed-out experiences where safeguards are weaker.
  • A threshold token should reveal only the minimum age result, remain unlinkable across services and avoid giving platforms or intermediaries a map of the child’s digital activity.
  • The system needs transparent standards for accuracy, accessibility, appeal and correction when a child or adult is classified incorrectly.
  • Parental controls can support families, but they should not replace platform responsibility for safe defaults, healthy design and effective reporting.
  • Protection applied within regulated social networks does not automatically cover the wider web, games, messaging services, AI systems or network-level risks.
03

The Child-Friendly Internet perspective

Türkiye’s regulation is an important real-world test of whether age assurance and age-appropriate design can work together. The Child-Friendly Internet perspective supports minimum-disclosure assurance: a service may need a trustworthy signal that a user is within an age band, but it should not need the child’s name, identity document or reusable cross-service identifier. The longer-term goal should be a coordinated ecosystem in which networks and participating services can respond consistently to an appropriate assurance signal while the child’s identity and browsing activity remain decentralised and protected.

  • Evaluate whether the age token is technically unlinkable across platforms and limited to the specific assurance decision.
  • Measure whether under-15 use actually falls or merely shifts to false accounts and less regulated services.
  • Require services to demonstrate that teen defaults improve safety and digital wellbeing in practice.
  • Extend protection beyond individual social platforms through interoperable, privacy-preserving assurance and coordinated responsibilities.
  • Preserve growing autonomy by ensuring safeguards evolve with age and do not become permanent surveillance.
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The central question

Can Türkiye enforce age-appropriate digital services while proving that children’s identities and activity cannot be linked across the Internet?